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A Base-line survey of business





E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
Several African countries continue to underperform in science, technology and innovation (ST&I)
despite  increasing GDP growth rates and foreign direct investment in the continent in recent
years. This is partly because of the absence of adequate incentives for technology transfer, which
consolidates context-specific local content requirements and demands for a favourable business
environment by private sector actors. Science, technology and innovation (STI) are engines of
growth in any economy. Yet, several countries on the continent continuously fail in meeting the set
STI goals and developmental objectives in their development plans, and regional instruments such
as Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA), which articulates the
African Union (AU) agenda for harnessing STI to boost economic growth and improve the lives of
African people.  
 
As an alternative to the new institutional economic approach which relies on formal institutions,
good governance and value chain economics, this baseline study use a political settlement
approach to bring the history and political economy of public-private partnerships and its impact
on technology transfer in sharper contrast. The over-reliance on investment incentives such as tax
exemptions and inadequate regulatory and institutional frameworks in African countries has led to
pervasive levels of capital flight, tax avoidance and corruption, which further translates into
unsustainable revenue buoyancy for many countries on the continent. Additionally, punitive tax
regimes for businesses and the lack of proper tax administration also increases the burden for
private sector actors in many African countries. Not surprisingly, extra-legal or informal social
transactions continue to be the main determinants of industrial and investment policies in Africa.
Such arrangements have seen the over-dependence on macro-economic indicators such as FDI
and export, at the expense of local infant industries and plausible local content requirements which
encourage technology and knowledge transfer through PPPs. 
Through the sustainable development Goal (SDG) 9, countries have pledged to ‘build resilient
infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation’ in their
countries. In particular, SDG Target 9.5 calls upon states to encourage innovation and substantially
increase the number of researchers, as well as public and private spending on research and
development. Additionally, the lack of adequate skills for industry, and insufficient financial
support for skills development continue to plague the continents skill-starved manufacturing and
industry sectors. Only three sub-Saharan African countries are close to meeting the 1% target as
expenditure of GDP on research and development. It is the hope that this base-line survey
will  contribute to new ways of engaging with questions around public-private partnerships and
technology transfer strategies or policies in African countries.
 
The government of Tanzania (GoT) is currently at a crossroads in redefining its
relationship with the private sector. The second Five-Year Development Plan
(FYDP) 2016/17 -2020/2021 describes the developmental approach under
President John P. Magufuli as a ‘business unusual’ approach, which entrenches
policy and institutional reforms required by the government to play an active role
within the private sector  (URT 2016, 3). Through the FYDP, whose theme
is  ‘nurturing industrialisation for economic transformation and human
development’,  the GoT is seeking to discipline rent with a ‘pragmatic approach’,
including direct involvement in deals making (Andreoni 2017, 4). The GoT aims to
do so by ‘strengthening dialogue mechanisms with the private sector and other
stakeholders, given the fact that some of the reforms are likely to trigger trade-
offs’ (URT 2016, 2). What is certain is that the GoT is seeking ways to renegotiate
its relationship with the private sector and to re-establish public trust in
institutions which have been marred by high levels of corruption scandals in the
recent past (Nyang’oro 2017, Cooksey 2017).
This report, therefore, aims to evaluate the impact of public-private partnerships as
described by the National Public-Private Partnership Policy on technology transfer
in Tanzania. While there is no clear-cut definition for technology transfer, this
report considers technology transfer as the transfer of ‘theoretical and practical
knowledge, skills, and artefacts that can be used to develop products and services
as well as the production and delivery of these theoretical and practical knowledge
systems’ (Burgelman, Christensen, and Wheelwright 2008). In order to determine
the impact of PPPs on technology transfer, the report reviews policy requirements
which support science, technology and innovation (STI), protect and support infant
industries, and encourages job creation in Tanzania. In addition to their usefulness
as a vehicle for poverty alleviation and investments, PPPs can also allow the public
sector to access the benefits brought by the private sector in terms skills and
management (Kavishe, Jefferson, and Chileshe 2019, 354). 
Investors evaluating investment options, governments interested in improving
business conditions, and developmental organisations seeking to explain economic
performance have always grappled with defining and measuring the business
environment. While there are challenges in obtaining reliable data for a
comprehensive analysis of public-private partnership on technology transfer (TT),
some business environment indicators and local content requirements (LCR)    can
be useful indicators in such an analysis. 
BACKGROUND
Figure 1 Innovation and Knowledge and Technology Output - Global Innovation Index 2019
The assumption here is that – a favourable business environment (BE) attracts
much needed foreign direct investment (FDI) in the form of investors or private
sector actors with the potential capital to develop and support local industries
through ‘learning by doing’ or technology and knowledge transfer. Secondly,
favourable local content requirements in the form of public policy and
regulations may ensure that a certain percentage of knowledge, intermediate
goods, and raw materials used in production or processing are sourced from
domestic manufacturers. Most African countries, including Tanzania and the
comparator countries considered in this survey, struggle in both innovation and
science and technology output domains (see Figure 1). 
Based on these assumptions, we can conclude that favourable local content
requirements and the right business environment increase STI for local infant
industries, and present opportunities for local enterprises to become
internationally competitive in their technology and manufacturing capability,
and eventually create more jobs. In other words, LCRs provide incentives for
local firms to produce and innovate in the most promising sectors and
potentially lower their production costs over time.
Therefore, the ambitions of the GoT to rework its relationship with the private
sector presents an opportunity for developmental organisations to propose
strategies and actions which intend to marry public expectations - policy and
regulatory - and those of the private sector – a favourable business
environment (BE).  However, commonly used analytical approaches used to
determine the impact of public-private partnerships on technology transfer
such as value  chain analysis and new institutional economic assumptions may
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produce poor results in countries where the regulatory and institutional
framework is weak,  and where informal social transactions remain prominent
determinants of policy choices and outcomes  (Khan 1995, Khan 2017).  Put
differently, to understand the drivers of economic change; a political settlement
approach can be a more useful tool in analysing the way specific policy choices
emerge. Such an approach provides insight into the continues negotiation of
policy choices either through state action or pressure and relationships between
the state and different private sector actors (Behuria, Buur, and Gray 2017, 523).
Hence, by relying on a political settlement framework, this baseline study brings
the history and political economy of public-private partnerships and its impact on
technology transfer in Tanzania into sharper focus. While the  recent policy
reforms in the business sector have been described as interventionist and
‘creating unwanted uncertainty in the business environment in
Tanzania’  (Ng'wanakilala 2019), contemporary political and economic
interventions must be understood within a broader historical context. For
example, the negative impact of tax evasion, high-levels of corruption and
clientelism or primitive rent-seeking within the business sector, and public
institutions (Gray 2013), and low levels of technology and knowledge transfer
cannot be excluded from any analysis of the business environment in Tanzania
today. 
This report, therefore, aims to situate government expectations in terms of policy
and statutory requirements, exemplified in LCR, within the needs and demands of
the private sector – a favourable business environment. It is the hope that this
base-line survey will  contribute to efforts made by developmental organisations
to design non-confrontational dialogue mechanisms to enhance public-private
partnerships and technology transfer strategies or policies in Tanzania.
The agriculture sector and
public-private partnerships in
Tanzania
Tanzania’s economy remains heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture (Mongi et
al., 2010). Over a quarter of  Tanzania’s gross domestic product (GDP) comes from
the agrarian sector, providing 85 per cent of exports, and employing 75 per cent of
the workforce (World Bank 2019). Due to the significance of agriculture in state
revenue and employment, the Tanzanian government sees export-oriented
agriculture, mainly large commercial agriculture in crops such as coffee, tea, sugar
cane and sisal as a development opportunity  (SAGCOT 2011). The Tanzanian
Government, through concerned Ministries like the Minister for Industry, Trade
and Investment, and institutions like the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and
the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF), engage in export-oriented
agriculture as a means to increase foreign direct investments, farmers income,
technology transfer, and employment. 
 
However, in recent years, the agrarian sector in Tanzania has been affected by
repeated climatic and economic shocks, resulting in sustained low crop yields and
food insecurity at both household and national levels  (Henry et al., 2019,
Thornton et al. 2019).  This is despite Tanzania having had an average  gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 6% between 2010 and 2018, compared to
the sub-Saharan Africa GDP growth rate average of 2.98% of the over the same
period (World Bank 2019). Also, Tanzania’s population growth is one of the fastest
in the  world,  at a rate of over 2.7% per year  (Agwanda and Amani 2014), with
implications on many facets of planning and economic management as well as
food security (Mashindano and Maro 2011, 14).
By attracting investors, multinational companies (MNC), state-owned enterprises
(SOE) and sovereign wealth funds (SWF), large commercial farms have become a
means to accumulate capital and much needed FDI through the acquisition of
‘cheaply’ available land and labour (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010).  The challenge
for Tanzania, therefore, is to use the potential embedded in agriculture to
contribute towards poverty reduction, economic growth, and food security.
Take, for example, the Agriculture Sector Development Programme ASDP, which
was launched by the government of Tanzania (GoT) in October 2001, to create an
enabling and conducive environment for ‘improving profitability’ in the agrarian
sector, as the basis for improved farm income and rural poverty reduction (ASDS
2001). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World
Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU), Irish Aid
and the Japanese International  Cooperation Agency (JICA) were the leading
donors in the first phase of the ASDP which ran from 2006 -2013. Within the
strategic framework of the ASDP (see  Figure  3), President Kikwete launched
the  Kilimo Kwanza  – agriculture first strategy on the 3rd of August 2009 as a
national resolve to accelerate agriculture transformation in Tanzania by ‘providing
incentives to attract more agricultural investors’ (Mousseau and Mittal 2011, 15). 
Within the same institutional framework, President Kikwete launched the
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) partnership
(See  Figure 2) in May 2010 as part of the  Kilimo Kwanza  strategy -  (SAGCOT
2010). The SAGCOT partnership aims to facilitate the development of clusters of
profitable agricultural businesses (see  Figure4) within the Southern Corridor of
Tanzania  (SAGCOT 2010b). The corridor covers approximately one-third of
mainland Tanzania. It extends north and south of the central rail, road and power
‘backbone’ that runs from Dar es Salaam to the northern areas of Zambia and
Malawi  (Bergius, Benjaminsen, and Widgren 2018, Steffens, Hartmann, and
Dannenberg 2019).  The SAGCOT encompasses the regions of Dar es Salaam,
Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya, Ruvuma, Njombe, Rukwa & Katavi (SAGCOT 2010b).
Figure 2 Strategic public-private partnership within the SAGCOT
Primarily influenced by the private sector (see Figure 2), the SAGCOT is expected to
produce 680,000 tonnes of field crops (maize, tea, soya and wheat), 630,000 tonnes
of rice, 4.4 million tonnes of sugar case, 3,500 tonnes of red meat and 32,000 tonnes
of high-value fruits by 2030 (SAGCOT 2011, Mbunda 2016, 282)
 
Initiatives like the SACGOT fall within Tanzania’s  Development Vision (TDV), and
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (Mkukuta) (see  Figure  3).
The TDV is designed to transform Tanzania into an emerging economy by
2025  (MAFAP 2013). Other strategies for implementing TDV 2025 include The
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework
and successive five-year development plans. In an analysis of Food and Agricultural
Policies in Africa by the FAO, authors described the SAGCOT ‘as an opportunity for
aligning public investment with policies aimed at increasing agricultural output and
productivity, while reducing hunger and poverty (Angelucci et al. 2013, 135). The
SACGOT is implemented by an operational support system, the SAGCOT Centre
Ltd, which was established as a limited company by guarantee in 2011  (SAGCOT
2010b).
Figure 3 SAGCOT within Tanzania's developmental and agricultural
strategic framework
However,  while the SAGCOT makes claims of extensive benefits to Tanzania’s
smallholder farmers, such as technology transfer and increased income
(see Figure 4),   Mbunda (2016, 282) observed that policymakers did not sufficiently
integrate small-scale farmers in the conception, designing and implementation
stages of the SAGCOT initiative.  There have been reports about land disputes in
Southern Highland of Tanzania  (Schiavoni et al. 2018, Twomey, Schiavoni, and
Mongula 2015b), while authors like Mousseau and Mittal (2011, 26) have reported
incidences of deprivation from essential human rights, and discriminatory decision
and policy-making processes during the implementation of large-scale land
acquisition schemes within the SAGCOT.  
Figure 4 Illustration of an agricultural cluster and a value chain envisaged by the SAGCOT
partnership scheme (SAGCOT 2011, 8)
The mining sector and public-
private partnerships in
Tanzania
The ambitions of Mw. Julius K. Nyerere to allow mineral resources in Tanzania
unexploited until the technological and knowledge base of the Tanzanian economy
is mature enough,  played an important part in the slow growth and development of
the mining sector in Tanzania. This prevented private sector access to mining
opportunities during the socialist era until the late 1990’s when new mining
reforms were introduced under the influence of the World Bank. The introduction
of the 1998 Mining Act, promoted by the World Bank, was considered to be very
attractive to foreign investors  (Campbell and Bhatia 1998).  Lange and Kinyondo
(2016, 1097)  report that during the first four years following implementation of
the new legislation, four large scale gold mines were established (see Table 1)
Table 1 Large scale gold mines in Tanzania (by year of project start) Source: (Lange
and Kinyondo 2016, 1069)
The new 1998 mining regulations undermined the importance of protecting local
communities and focused on macro-economic benefits by inviting foreign mining
companies into Tanzania. Investments in the mining sector became very
controversial for a number of reasons. Firstly, displaced people complained of
unfair treatment. Secondly, companies had been granted a lucrative VAT and duty
exemptions which negatively affected revenue buoyancy  (Lange 2011). For
example, mining companies in Tanzania had been granted a five-year period of VAT
and duty exemption, and by 2002, seven large-scale mines contributed only USD
36.2 million in revenue (Lange 2011). Although Tanzania was the third-largest gold
producer in Africa by 2008, the annual royalties from mining were less than USD
30 million (TMAA, 2015:9). According to  Lange and Kinyondo (2016)  among the
five mines established in the period 1999–2005, two have never paid corporate
taxes, and the three others started paying only after 7, 9 and 11 years of operation,
respectively (see Table 1).
According to the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF), the awareness of
local content was low up until 2013 ‘as the government didn’t really think about it
before and local content was not really a language at the time’  (Lange and
Kinyondo 2016). With increasing pressure from civil society organisations on the
importance of local content reforms, the two major mining companies, Acacia and
GGM, together with the government authorities, responded by establishing the
Integrated Mine Technical Training Programme (IMTT) at the Arusha Technical
College (NECTA) and Moshi VETA College in 2009. While the project has equipped
the sector with better-qualified employees, it has most probably not entailed that
Tanzanians have replaced expats in the sector to any significant degree.
Additionally, the media has witnessed increasing reports of tax evasion and under-
reporting mining activity by many mining companies in Tanzania. The latest example that
of the London-listed gold-mining company, Acacia gold scandal of 2017 (Lauwo, Kyriacou,
and Dedoulis 2017). Acacia gold was charged with a bill of $190bn for supposedly unpaid
taxes. This also pushed the GoT to introduce further scrutiny and regulatory reforms in
the extractive and natural resource sector, including the passing of the  Natural Wealth
and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act (PSA)  in July 2017, and the  Public-Private
Partnership (Amendment) Bill 2018 (Roder 2019, Poncian 2019). These new regulatory
reforms are aimed at ensuring that foreign investors resolve disputes exclusively through
Tanzania's domestic courts, without recourse to international arbitration  (Henstridge
2018). 
In an interview with a director at the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation, after a series of
expert investigations, it was alleged that Acacia had robbed the taxpayer of billions of
shillings by exporting undeclared minerals. Additionally, royalties were undervalued at
4%, and Magufuli had succeeded to renegotiate an increase in royalties which currently
stands at 16% and the repayment of $300 million in settlements by the mining
company(du Venage 2017).    There has recently been the formation of a public-private
platform called the Tigwa-group between Acacia and the government of Tanzania. It is
expected that Twiga will give the GoT full visibility, access and participation in decisions
made for and by the mining company in Tanzania.
METHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH
This baseline survey uses a mixed methodological approach. For initial analysis of
secondary data, extensive literature review and documentary analysis on scientific
literature were conducted using -   public policy documents, civil society and media
reports, and internal documents on investments policy and public-private partnerships
in Tanzania. Primary data was collected between December 2017 and September 2018.
The survey draws on interviews and consultations with a broad range of stakeholders in
Tanzania. Meetings were held with officials from the private sector; Tanzania Private
Sector Foundation (TPSF); Civil Society Organisations (CSO); Legal and Human Rights
Centre (LHRC), Tanzania, Business and Human Rights Tanzania (BHRT), Activists,
Tanganyika Legal Society, Tanzania National Farmers Network (MVIWATA), and
Tanzania National Committee of Family Farming (TANCOFF); Public institutions;
Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) Tanzania; three
independent consultants and academics (University of Dar es Salaam staff, Saint
Augustin University Staff). 
 
Secondly, quantitative data on Business Environment Indicators (BEI), employment data
and LCR data such as S&T indicators on Tanzania and comparator countries, including
Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi and South Africa were sourced from the
World Bank development indicators repository, the Global Innovation Indicator Index
Data, and public statistics from the various counties. Qualitative data was coded and
categorised using NVIVO, while quantitative data was analysed using the statistical
software R.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The analytical framework used in this survey is a political settlement framework (PSF),
which was introduced by  Khan (1995)  as a substitute for New Institutional Economics
(NIE). A political settlement approach has much more specific meaning as a strategic
political economy analytical framework that provides a novel way of understanding the
drivers and outcomes of contemporary socioeconomic change (Behuria, Buur, and Gray
2017, 508, Gray 2013). It refers to the combination of power and institutions that are
mutually compatible and sustainable in terms of political and economic viability'  (Khan
2017).  The political settlement supports the analysis of institutions and helps
understand why institutional arrangements may work well in certain parts of the world
but produce poor results in others  (Khan 1995, Khan 2017). In other words, the PSF
helps analyse how institutional arrangements emerge or fail to realise their
developmental objectives (Khan, 2010). 
A political settlement is the continues struggles for distribution of power and rent
between powerful social groups within a specific social context. An understanding of the
continues negotiation of power and rent between social groups in a given country, sector
or organisation is needed to understand the local importance of particular features of
institutions and the ‘holding of power’.  
By understanding the political settlement between private capital, which continuously
negotiates for favourable investment policies, and the government’s effort to increase
political ‘legitimacy’ and support by enacting policies which protect infant industries,
such an approach provides unique insight into political and economic change in
Tanzania. It takes into account formal institutional arrangements such as the role of law,
and non-formal transactions such as bribery and corruption, to understand how specific
institutional arrangements are sustained or disrupted in the continues struggle for the
distribution of power and rent among powerful social groups. Understanding
how  governments and institutions work,  and appreciating the organisation of local
political economies in developing countries is a prerequisite for development
intervention  (Behuria, Buur, and Gray 2017, 509).
 
Gray (2013) has used the political settlement framework as a tool to analyse aspects of
continuity and change in Tanzania’s industrial policies since independence. Nazneen and
Hickey (2019) have used the political settlement approach to evaluate the complexities
in negotiating ‘gender equity in the global south’. Andreoni (2017) carries out an in-dept
political settlement analysis of the anti-corruption campaign under the Magufuli regime
in Tanzania, and  Usman (2019)  looks into the successes and failures of economic
reforms in Nigeria using a political settlement framework. The political settlement
approach has also been used by the Partnership for African Social and Governance
Research in Nairobi, and the Hierarchies of Rights: Land and Investments in Africa at
the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique  (Behuria, Buur, and Gray 2017,
510). While these are just a few of the extensive literature and use of the political
settlement analysis, the ‘recurring theme in these analyses is the underlying power
dynamics shaping institutional policy performance’ (Kelsall 2018, 6).
This survey, therefore, regards public-private partnerships as the social foundation
within which policy choices are negotiated, supported or disrupted.  Such partnerships
involve the continues negotiation for a favourable business environment to increase
profits and incentives for businesses, while governments negotiate for policies to
encourage job creation, protect infant industry and enhance technology transfer to
increase political support. Institutions and power relations are seen within such an
analysis as arrangements that characterise the social order in a particular country
within a broader global economic context. It places these processes specifically within
the context of global capitalism while allowing for a much richer understanding of the
economy by drawing from various theories of economic change  (Behuria, Buur, and
Gray 2017, 524). For example, the developmental objectives of the GoT are expressed
through policy and regulation, and the private sector continues to advocate for policies
that will increase profitability and fair competition.  The GoT may use policies and
regulatory mechanisms such as local content requirements to augment political
support, protect infant industries and incentivise innovation and job creation, while
private sector actors may use or withhold capital to sustain or disrupt policies which
may impact businesses. That is, private sector actors may support local content policies
and regulations if such policies and regulations are beneficial to the needs and
aspirations of the private sector. 
As an illustration, lower factions of the ruling coalition, including infant industries, and
the constitution of voters may sustain or undermine the survival of the ruling coalition.
The greater the power of higher factions of the ruling coalition relative to lower
factions, the stronger the coalition’s implementation and enforcement capacities. In
such an analysis, questions about legitimacy become salient. In other words, the ability
of the ruling coalition to implement or enforce policies and regulations, e.g. taxation
and interest rates    - depends on the probability that other authorities, private sector
institutions, and the constitution of voters will act to confirm the decisions of the given
authority (Tilly 2017).
 
Finally, studying and understanding how political settlements are financed helps
determine the relationship between the ruling coalition and economic actors. For
example, the histories of particular firms, multinational corporations, mining companies
and business individuals are critical in determining specific political and economic
outcomes in an economy. It is essential in this case to look at ownership structures
within particular sectors of the economy, and those who work in financial institutions –
political party elites, friends, and ethnicity engagements with the ruling coalition. 
Figure 5 Political Settlement for technology transfer: Business Environment (BE) Vs Local Content
Require (LCR)
Figure 5  illustrates four possible outcomes of the struggle for a favourable business
environment (BEi), and strong local content requirement (LCRi), between the GoT and
private sector actors in establishing a sustainable public-private partnership.
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK
Scenario 01
Business Environment demands are weaker than Local Content Requirements (BEw  <
LCRi). The top - left quadrant of the political settlement framework represents a scenario where
business environment policies are weak - described by  BEw,  while the incentive or policy and
regulatory framework for local content requirements are strong – represented by LCRi.  In this
scenario, private sector investors with potential capital may withhold much-needed capital for
the development and support of local industries. In this case, for example, the government may
struggle to compete with the cost of subsidies provided to infant industries, and venture
capitalist may increase the cost of capital needed by local private sector actors for STI.  
Both business environment demands, and local content requirements are strong (BEi = LCRi).
The top -    right quadrant of the political settlement represents a scenario where business
environment policies are strong - represented by  BEi,  and the incentive or policy and
regulatory framework for local content requirements are equally strong – represented
by  LCRi.  In this scenario, private sector investors with potential capital have the incentive to
provide capital to develop and support local industries. In this case, private sector actors also
support LCR as such reforms may be beneficial to the expectations of the private sector. The
favourable and robust LCR may counteract government subsidies in other countries – reducing
public expenditure on subsidies for local industries, venture capitalist will benefit from an




Both business environment demands and local content requirements are weak  (LCRw=
BEw). The bottom -  left quadrant of the political settlement represents a scenario where local
content requirement - policy and regulation - are inadequate, represented by the
symbol  LCRw,  and  business environment policies are weak - represented by the
symbol BEw. For example, in this scenario, private sector investors with potential capital may
withhold much needed capital to develop and support local industries. There may also be high
incidences of capital flight through tax evasion/avoidance, corruption and clientelism. ‘The
misalignment between formal institutions of the state and the ways that powerful groups
organise to make claims on the state is a significant driver of clientelism in low-income
countries’ like Tanzania (Behuria, Buur, and Gray 2017, 511). Additionally, the government may
struggle with the cost of subsidies, a legitimacy crisis as lower factions of the ruling coalition
begin to challenge government policy and a decline in revenue collection through taxes.
Venture capitalist may also suffer due to an increase in non-performing loans. 
Scenario 04
Business Environment demands are more robust than Local Content Requirements  LCRw  <
BEi.  The bottom - right of the political settlement framework represents a scenario where local
content requirement -policy and regulation- are weak, represented by the symbol LCRw, while
business environment policies are strong - represented by the symbol BEi. In this scenario, for
example, private sector investors will not adhere to local content requirements but may
continue to provide capital which may be co-opted by government elites in rent-seeking, or
clientelism to secure its short-term survival. Capital needed for the protection and support of
local industries may be misused. The government may lose political support, struggle to
compete with the cost of subsidies, and venture capitalist may suffer due to the increase in non-
performing loans as local industries become less competitive. 
After illustrating the analytical framework, the next section takes a detailed look at the
business environment in Tanzania, relative to comparator countries. As described earlier,
qualitative data from interviews with key stakeholders in the public and business sectors are
used in defining the business environment in Tanzania. Quantitative date from the World Bank
development indicators, more specifically from the ‘business environment enterprise survey’
has been used to describe the business environment. 
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN
TANZANIA AND COMPARATOR
COUNTRIES
‘Investors are like birds; they always stay up a tree which is stable - and has
fruits. This is what Tanzania is like today; there are areas with big potential for
investments and also has stable political stability.’
By Israeli Minister of Justice Ms Ayelet
Shaked -The Citizen 4th May 2018.
This quote by the Israeli Minister of Justice was made during a two-day Tanzania-Israeli
Business and Investment Forum in Dar es Salaam in April 2018. Three discursive elements
stand out from the quote, and these elements can be analysed in greater detail.   First, the
nature of investors; described like birds, they perch where there are potential high hanging
fruits or resources which can be used to increase profit or meet their business goals and
ambitions. Second, investors need a suitable environment to grow and build their nest,
which is – political stability – political stability denotes a predictable policy and regulatory
framework for investments. Uncertainty is bad for business and investors, who may not
invest where there is high uncertainty. The final discursive element is the relationship
between investors and those at the bottom of the proverbial tree.
The analogy from the Israeli minister cannot be more befitting of the nature and
relationship between impacted citizens and the swarm of investors.  Those at the
bottom of the proverbial tree are a majority Tanzanian citizen, mainly agrarian workers, who
are less likely to benefit from the high hanging fruits produced by the so-called ‘favourable
business environment'. This section takes a detailed look at the business environment using
interview data from public policy documents,    consultations with key stakeholders in
Tanzania, and indicators from the World Bank. 
The business environment (BE) is a combination of internal and external factors that
influence a company's operating capacity in a given country or socio-political and economic
context. These factors include the availability of a reliable ecosystem for businesses such as
clients and suppliers, improvements in science, technology and incentives for innovation,
the rule of law, government policy and politics, including market, social and economic
trends.
The economic growth of any economy can be
measured by the change in the volume of
output or the real incomes of its residents.
According to the United Nations System of
National Accounts  (UNSC 2009), there are
three plausible indicators for calculating
growth. These are (1) the volume of gross
domestic product (GDP), (2) real gross
domestic income, and (3) real gross national
income.
Figure 6: GDP Growth of Tanzania  (1x1011 )USD 1990 -2018
This base-line survey uses the GDP as a measure of economic growth in Tanzania and
comparator countries. Comparator countries are Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Burundi
and Ethiopia. These countries have been chosen because they are in the same economic zone as
Tanzania, i.e., the East African Community (EAC) and Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC), excluding Ethiopia which is in the East African region but not a member of these inter-
governmental organisations. 
01
The Economy of Tanzania
and  Comparators
The expansion of a country’s GDP is indicative of a growing economy, while a contraction in
GDP indicates a slowdown in a country's economy. GDP accounts for all domestic production
regardless of whether the income increases through domestic or foreign institutions.
Additionally, a country's projected GDP growth rate can be used to determine if companies
operating within the country are likely to experience growth. The GDP growth rate provides
insight into how fast the economy is growing by comparing one-quarter of the country’s GDP
to the previous quarter. The GDP growth rate is determined by factors such as  personal
consumption, which includes retails and consumer rates; Government spending, which include
social security, defence and welfare-related spending. Another factor which determines the
GDP growth rate is the net trade – the difference between the total value of exported goods
and services, and the total value of imported products. Finally, the  Business investment  –
including real estate, hard and soft infrastructure and inventory levels constitute an important
determinant of GDP growth rate.
Figure 6  shows the GDP of Tanzania, which measures the economic output of the
economy. Figure 7 is the GDP growth rate of Tanzania and comparator countries, split between
1990-2000, and 2000-2018. These figures provide different perspectives into the nature of
the economy and provide valuable insight for investors on economic performance. There has
been a constant increase between 1990 – 2018 in GDP growth in Tanzania. This increase in
GDP is also reflected in the average annual GDP growth rate of Tanzania in  Figure 7, which
increase from 3% between 1990-2000 to 6.4% between 2000-2018. Compared to its
comparators, Tanzania’s GDP growth rate by sector (see Figure 8) shows a GDP growth rate of
8.8% and 7.8% in industry and manufacturing respectively in from 2000-2018. However, in the
agrarian sector, a GDP growth rate of 4.3%, below the total average of 6.4% is indicative of
relatively slower growth in the agricultural industry.
Figure7 GDP Average annual % growth of Tanzania and comparators 1990 - 2018
For example, in the manufacturing sector, Tanzania’s GDP growth rate is 7.8% compared to
Kenya and Uganda with an average GDP growth rate of 3.4% and 5.4% respectively. Burundi
seems to underperform in all sectors, while Ethiopia outperforms all competitors in the region. 
Figure 8  Per cent annual GDP growth rate and GDP growth rate by sector for Tanzania and
comparators 2000-2018
02 Employment rates inTanzania and its
Comparators
IMPORTANT POINT!
What defines the prosperity of
a country is  its  consumption.  A
country that has 80%
consumption as a percentage
of GDP is  certainly prosperous.
But today,  ask yourself  what is









The productivity and wealth of a country’s population are amongst the most important
determinants of economic success. Employment indicators, such as the  labour force, payroll,
and unemployment, estimate how many citizens are employed and whether they are making
more or less money than before. The financial markets carefully watch these employment
indicators, to understand and make predictions on consumer spending. Low employment rates
are often associated with low consumer spending, which can hurt GDP statistics and overall
economic growth prospects.
 
Tanzania’s economy is predominantly agrarian, employing an average of 66.45% of the
workforce in 2018. This has several implications in determining consumer spending
habits, especially in cases where a majority of those employed in the agrarian sector are
subsistence farmers – they consume what they produce. South Africa employed 7% in the
agricultural industry within the same period, with an agrarian  industry  that is less
subsistence than that in Tanzania. From Table 2, Tanzania witnessed a decrease in the rate
of employment in the agricultural sector from an average of 82.55% in 2000 to an average
of 66.45% in 2018. There was an increase in the employment rate in manufacturing from
2.9 % to about 7% during the same periods, and in the service industries from 14.55% in
2000 to 26.6% in 2018.
The increase in employment rates in the manufacturing and service industries can be
explained by an increase in public policy towards foreign direct investments, which has led
to an  increase in the demand for non-agricultural rural employment (NARE). Hence,   a
decline in the demand for jobs in the agricultural sector. However, care must be taken
when interpreting data on non-agricultural related activities in countries like Tanzania
where it is reported that over 80% of women working in non-agriculture related activities
are employed as waste gatherers, labourers on construction sites, and domestic workers
or other low-paid occupations (Black 2015)
Figure 9 Average percent employment by sector in Tanzania and comparators 2000-2018
Compared to comparators, Tanzania is still lagging in the expansion of its manufacturing and
services industries. Table 2 shows that in 2018, the average employment rate in the
manufacturing industry in Tanzania stood at 7%, compared to South Africa and Kenya where
the manufacturing industries employed 22.1% and 7.35% of the workforce respectively. The
businesses implication on consumer spending, in this case, is easily predictable. Income
generated from employment in the service and manufacturing industry contributes directly to
the expansion of the economy through domestic consumer spending.  Figure 9 is a
representation of the average employment rate in Tanzania and comparator countries from
2000-2018. Lower rates of employment may indicate low levels of consumer spending, which
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Table 2 Breakdown of average percentage employment rate by sector  in Tanzania and its
comparators by sector 2000 - 2018
03 Regulation andTaxes in Tanzania
and Comparators
Business enterprises or investors are taxed on income or commercial profits from their
investments. The failure to file or pay tax can subject a business to penalties including fines,
interest and even possible jail time. For most companies, the aim is to reduce the amount of
taxes owed as much as possible. Thus, the impact of tax on investment and business
decisions comes down to how to minimise taxes on commercial profits.
On the other hand, taxes are the primary source of revenue for governments. The Source of
tax revenue is generally determined by changes in the economic priorities of the
government. Tax policy may reflect concerns about distributional effects (inequality),
economic efficiency (including corrections for externalities such as climate change or
pollution charges), and the practical problems of administering a tax system. There is no
ideal level of taxation. But taxes influence incentives and thus the behaviour of economic
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Table 3 shows that tax revenue collected as a percentage of GDP by the GoT increased by
2% from 2010 to 2017, this can be a result of changes in government attitude towards
social policy and spending. An example is the introduction of tuition-free education for
children between the ages of 8 and 12 in Tanzania under the Magufuli government (Asim,
Chugunov, and Gera 2019). The GoT has also increased spending on the improvement of
health care services in the country. Public expenditure on major infrastructures such as
roads, electricity and water can also be a reason for governments to increase taxes.
Improvements in tax administration can also be a good reason for the increase in the
amount of tax collected by the state. For example, one could argue that the high level of
tex revenue of South Africa is not as a result of high taxes, but a consequence of a
relatively  effective and efficient tax administration system. The reinforcement and
introduction of Electronic Fiscal Device (EFD), including online Tax Identification
Numbers (TIN) by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) in recent years, could also
provide some explanation for the increase in tax revenue.
However, tax evasion and avoidance is still an issue of concern for revenue buoyancy in
Tanzania. In June 2018, the Executive Director of Tax Justice Network Africa (TJNA), Mr
Jason Braganza, during the presentation of the report 'financial secrecy index 2018: said
‘the lack of agreements with regards to information exchange has made Tanzania a
lucrative country for companies and individuals seeking offshore accounts’. 
Table 3 Tax policy in Tanzania and comparators
At the breakfast debate organised by the Policy Forum in Dar es Salaam, Mr Braganza
added that Tanzania's reluctance to sign the Multilateral Convention on Mutual
Administration Assistance in Tax Matters (MATM) and the government’s withdrawal
from the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2017 have sealed Tanzania’s place as a
significant offshore destination for illicit transactions. According to Mr Braganza,
Tanzania also suffers from the lack of a  comprehensive legal framework to ensure
disclosure of beneficial ownership of companies registered in the country. 
Figure 10 2018 Tax policy in Tanzania and comparators
Practical problems in the administration of tax collection can act as a cost to businesses, as
such issues may increase cost on investments. For example, from Figure  10, Tanzania has
the highest number of tax payments[1] --sixty - made by businesses, as compared to South
African based businesses which make only seven tax payments. This is a reflection of the
total number of taxes paid by businesses, including electronic filing. This also strongly
correlate with the time[2] needed to prepare and pay taxes, i.e., time it takes to prepare,
file, and pay (or withhold) taxes. In 2018, businesses and investments based in Tanzania
spent over 207 hours to prepare and pay tax, while businesses in comparator countries
like Rwanda and Kenya spend 180 and 96 hours/year respectively. Ethiopia has the
highest number of hours used by businesses to file or pay for Tax – 300 hours. 
It is, therefore, very obvious that Tanzania, still faces problems in clearly defining the
‘investment environment’ to support revenue buoyancy and increase profitability for the
private sector. Tanzania must take a view of these policies to ensure that the people of
Tanzania benefit from the influx of investors into the country. By controlling the illicit flow
of ‘company revenue’ and increasing transparency within the business  environment, the
GoT can increase tax revenue collection. This can be done by addressing tax
administration challenges.
[1] The tax is counted as 2018 tax payment data. 
[2] Time is calculated here in hours per year to pay the corporate income tax, the value
added or sales tax, and labour taxes, including payroll taxes and social security
contributions.
While these tax policy indicators cannot be treated in isolation, it is important to note that
they are all mutually enforcing. They contribute to the perception of businesses and
investors about the investment climate or business environment. In all, as businesses
advocate for lower taxes or make efforts to cut down the cost of taxes on business profits,
the total amount of tax[1] in a country may be an important factor in informing investors and
business about the business environment of a country. In this case, Tanzania has the highest
tax rate of 44% percentage on business profit, compared to South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya
which have 29.1%, 41.2% and 37. 2% respectively.  According to an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) report focusing on East Africa, incentives - particularly tax incentives are not the
only factor in attracting investments. However, political stability, functional and quality
infrastructure and predictable macroeconomic policy were identified as critical for
attracting business and investments in a country (IMF 2008).
[1] Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses after
accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions as a share of commercial profits. 
04 Inf rastructure inTanzania and
Comparators
This report views infrastructure within the business investment in two broad categories:
hard infrastructure - roads, electricity, dams, water supply, telecommunication; and soft
infrastructure - permits and licences, knowledge, fairness and anti-corruption mechanisms
(see Figure 11). Businesses are primarily concerned with hard infrastructure because it has a
direct impact. However, soft infrastructure has a secondary impact and is also important in
















0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15
As mentioned earlier, an essential factor in investment decision making is the quality of
infrastructure in the destination country. Reliability and availability of infrastructure  benefits
households, support development, increases the movement of labour and enhances
communication or the transfer of goods and services. Firms with access to modern and efficient
infrastructure - telecommunications, electricity, and transport - can be more productive. A reliable
infrastructure enhances the competitiveness of the economy and generates a business
environment conducive to firm growth and development. For example, good infrastructure
efficiently connects firms to their customers and suppliers and enables the use of modern
production technologies.
Conversely, deficiencies in infrastructure, such as intermittent electricity supply, creates barriers
to productive opportunities and increase costs for all firms - from micro-enterprises to large
multinational corporations. For example, firms in Tanzania reported 15.1% of losses in value due
to intermittent electricity supply, as compared to South Africa and Rwanda businesses which loss
just 1.6% and 7% in value respectively (see Table 4).  Among comparator countries, Tanzania based
businesses had the highest loss in value due to the intermittent nature of electricity supply. 
Table 4 Infrastructure indicators for the business environment in Tanzania and comparator countries
Figure 11 Hard and soft infrastructure indicators for Tanzania and comparator between 2007 and 2018
Corruption and informality (see De Soto 2000) in the business sector can also increase cost and
burden for businesses in destination countries.   Campos et al. (1999) have argued that
corruption may impact businesses differently in instances where those  seeking favours from
the government are sure to obtain those favours. However, in countries with less corruption
and more predictable procedures tend to attract more investors than those with high
corruption levels. From Figure  11, while businesses in Kenya (26.4%) reported incidences of
corruption, firms registered in Tanzania (20.8%) also reported a high prevalence of corruption
relative to comparator countries like Rwanda (6.9%) and South Africa (4.2%). Burundi and
Ethiopia scored higher prevalence frequencies of corruption by businesses within the surveyed
period of 30.3% and 26.8% respectively. Informality or competition with unregister firm also
have consequences on the enforcement of competition laws and policy. The importance of
regularising businesses or what De Soto calls ‘dead capital’ has been extensively
documented  (De Soto 2000). 72.4% of firms in Tanzania reported that they are experiencing
competition from unregistered companies.
In summary, these factors should not be treated in isolation but should be understood within a
broader range of essential indicators used by investors and businesses to predict or make
investment decisions. Although the Tanzania economy continues to expand, other indicators
are pulling the countries attractiveness backwards. Policymakers, private sector actors,
development organisation like civil society organisations must think of strategies and non-
confrontational mechanism to address these challenges within the business environment in
Tanzania. In the next section, this report examines local content requirements (LCRs) in
Tanzania. That is, policy and regulatory mechanisms that are in place to ensure that a certain
percentage of intermediate goods,    knowledge and services used in production or processing
are sourced domestically. 




The meaning of university
education is to lunch you
into the world and to give
a means of getting into the
world. It is not every
graduate who gets a white-
collar job, but you are
being prepared more than
anybody else to face the
world.
By board member of the Tanzania
Private Sector Foundation,
interviewed September 2018
The GoT, through its FYDP, has pledged  to ‘continue improving the business
environment and in so doing, provide a wide range of appropriate incentives and support
to unleash the creativity of private sector and other stakeholders in harnessing
Tanzania’s comparative advantages.  The ambition of the government is to boost
productivity, enhance innovation, foster economic integration and deepen participation
in regional and global value chains’  (URT 2016).  Countries implement local content
requirements (LCRs) to strengthen their domestic industry, and to become competitive
in international markets and eventually secure associated local job creation. Proponents
of LCRs argue that, in the medium term, greater competition among businesses will
encourage innovation in the development of local industries and consequently lower
technology costs. Accordingly, the medium-term benefits will compensate for the short-
term cost on investments and incentives provided for the support and protection of local
infant industries. Also, proponents claim that, by promoting learning by doing and the
transfer of technology, LCRs foster sustainable practices within the economy. An
example of such a requirement is boasting investments and innovation in science,
technology and innovation (STI).
In realising that African countries can benefit from STI, the African Ministerial Council on
Science and Technology (AMCOST) adopted Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated
Plan of Action (CPA) in 2005. The CPA articulates the African Union (AU) agenda for
harnessing STI to boost economic growth and improve the lives of African people (Molotja,
Sithole, and Mumba 2014). Within this context, technology transfer is broadly viewed as  a
process that includes the facilitation of the diffusion of technological knowledge,  and
general issues related to the development of technical capabilities (Bessant and Rush 1995,
Amesse and Cohendet 2001). Through  sustainable development Goal (SDG) 9, countries
have pledged to ‘build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable
industrialization and foster innovation’.  In particular, SDG Target 9.5 calls upon countries to
encourage innovation and substantially increase the number of researchers, as well as
public and private spending on R&D. 
Both  Indicators 9.5.1 and 9.5.2, i.e., R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP and
Researchers per million inhabitants are considered in this baseline study as an indicator of
efforts made by governments with regards to the diffusion of technological knowledge. A
low number of researchers or technicians engaged in the creation of knowledge or creation
of new applications may impede the attainment of SDG9. In addition, businesses may be
less interested in countries where the knowledge base is weak and innovation indicators
are poor. So, how do we link the efforts made in science, technology and innovation to the
business environment, job creation, sustainable livelihoods and the improved well-being of
citizens? How should capacity and competencies be built in order to innovate? 
[1]  The fields of science and technology used to classify R&D according to the Revised Fields of Science and Technology
Classification are: 1. Natural sciences; 2. Engineering and technology; 3. Medical and health sciences; 4. Agricultural sciences; 5.
Social sciences; 6. Humanities and the arts.
This section will start by defining the STI indicators in Tanzania. The aim is to highlight the
needs of the GoT to encourage technology transfer through local content reforms which
are also suitable for business.    According to the United Nations (2004), to foster
development through technology transfer, – public and private organisations – must be
encouraged to (1) share information about innovations and outcome. (2)  provide incentives
(economic and non-economic) that create healthy competition.  (3)  Use a combination of
practical approaches pioneered by agencies such as the media, to produced and design
programmes and platforms for teaching- and practice-based case studies on inventive
processes. (4) maintaining a facilitative climate for innovation, dissemination and adoption
of technology.  
01 Sharing informationabout innovations
and outcomes
Researchers are professionals engaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge,
products, processes, methods and systems, as well as in the management of innovative
projects. For example, the FYDPII of Tanzania identifies the improvement of R&D in crops
cultivation as an area for strategic interventions  (URT 2016). Part of the challenges
plaguing crop production in Tanzania is the lack of technologies which improve soil
nutrient quality and weak research infrastructure. Table 5  shows that Tanzania is lagging






































Table 5 STI indicators for Tanzania and comparators
Figure 12 Expenditure on R&D as % percentage of GDP in Tanzania and comparator countries
Tanzania has just 18 researchers per million of its population, and six technicians per
million while comparator countries like South Africa have 473 researchers per million and
139 technicians per million. Burundi has the lowest number of researchers and
technicians among comparator countries (see  Table 5).   Additionally, there is a need for
proper systems, infrastructure and resources to diffuse information about innovations;
these can be done through broadcast, media or the production of scientific knowledge
and data. The GoT has completed the National ICT Infrastructure Backbone Project, by
laying 25,954 kilometres of optic fibre cable (OFC)[1]  covering 24 regions of mainland
Tanzania  (URT 2016, 17). However, such measures also depend on the number of
researchers, technicians and the willingness or ability of people to utilise published or
disseminated information. Here, literacy levels, media landscape, accessibility and the
cost of research output is vital.
For example, in 2016 the number of scientific and technical journal articles produced[2]
by researchers and technicians in Tanzania (see  Table  5)    was 539, compared to 11,881
produced by South African researchers and technicians in 2016. Burundi produced the
lowest number of scientific and technical journals within the surveyed period.
[1] OFC provides a solid base for scaling up the broadband access, connectivity and the provision of efficient services nationally and
in the region and ultimately provide 40 per cent of the communications services availed to land-locked countries in the region.
[2] The number of scientific and engineering articles published in the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics,
clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth and space sciences. The NSF considers article counts
from a set of journals covered by Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) 
IMPORTANT POINT!
Tanzania indeed lacks skilled people, and this is because…
there was laxity in making sure that the educational quality
and technical quality that we adopted could make
Tanzanians acquire the required skills.  But at the moment the
country has put up a policy at the technical and university
level,  and changes at the ministerial level – which has
combined all educations issues.
By board member of the Tanzania
Private Sector Foundation,
interviewed September 2018
Although efforts are being made by the GoT to increase education facilities and provide
support for research and technology, the GoT has continuously failed to meet its target of
one per cent of GDP on STI related activities (URT 2016, 17). Between 2005 and 2017,
Tanzania spent an average of 0.53% of its GDP on research and development
(see Figure 12).
Market failure is the principal reason for public sector spending in research and
technology transfer. In other words, research and innovation that is either not patentable,
identified with only long-term payoffs, or difficult to insure against failure usually
requires public spending. Research projects that do not directly yield marketable
products often fit the criteria for public sector involvement. The competitive market
system fails to provide the incentives for private-sector research and technology transfer
in these cases. An excellent example is agricultural research innovation at the primary
level.
02 Incentives thatcreate healthy
competiton
The  African  Union has set a  target  of 1% of  GDP  invested in R&D. Still, data available
show that only three sub-Saharan African countries are close to this target: South Africa
(0.8%), Kenya (0.7%) and Senegal (0.75%). The GoT recognises the inability of
educational institutions in Tanzania to marry skills training and skills required by the
labour market  (URT 2016). Additionally, low quality of education and inaccurate
investment and insufficient financial support for skills development have been
recognised by the GoT as a strategic area of skills development interventions (URT 2016,
178).
The sharing of information about innovation and outcomes cannot be evaluated in
isolation. It should be viewed in relation to public expenditures on R&D, and the
incentives provided by public and private organisation to create healthy competition for
innovation to thrive. Such incentives may include both capital and current expenditures
provided to the private sector, public enterprises, educational institutions and private
non-profit organisations. Other incentives could be from developmental partners, often
acquired through strategic partnerships with foreign organisations and multilateral
corporations. 
A good example is the Human Development Innovation Fund (HDIF) by UKAid providing
a £40 million competitive challenge grant to businesses, NGOs and research institutions
driving innovative approaches which aim to improve the quality, value-for-money, and
sustainability of basic services in: health, education, water, sanitation and hygiene
(WASH), and early childhood development in Tanzania. However, efforts need to be made
by the GoT to encourage domestic credit to the private sector. This may be in the form of
subsidies, grants, and other social benefits that are unrequited, nonrepayable transfers on
current account to private and public enterprises.  
Table 6 Incentive to private and public enterprises in Tanzania and comparator countries
Figure 13 Domestic credit and government subsidies to the private sector for Tanzania and
comparators in 2017
Figure 13  shows that in 2017, the GoT contributed 58% of GDP as subsidies, grants,
and other social benefits to private and public enterprises. While these may be a good
incentive to the private sector, it is also a burden on the provision of other public goods
by the Government such as the construction of roads, water and energy supply.
Additionally, it is difficult to statistically determine the impact of such subsidies on
technology transfer as they may be directed towards social and welfare causes rather
than ST&I.    For example, over the same period, over 15% of expenditure was on fuel
subsidies in Burundi.
More trackable domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial
corporations or equity services such as through loans, purchases of nonequity
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, is just 13.1% of GDP in
Tanzania compared to South Africa which is 65.7 % of GDP. This is an indication of high
incidences of risk, high non-performing loans, and lack of adequate security for lenders.
Private markets are the engine of productivity growth, creating productive jobs and
higher incomes. And with the government playing a complementary role of regulation,
funding, and service provision, private initiative and investment can help provide the
basic services and conditions that empower local industries.
Patent-based statistics reflect the inventive performance of countries, as well as the
subtleties (partnerships, MoUs) and co-operations in the innovation process or
technology paths. Patent data provide a uniquely comprehensive source of information
on inventive activity and the multiple dimensions of the innovative process (e.g.
geographical location, technical and institutional origin, individuals and
networks). Besides, according to the GoT,    Tanzania makes low use of advanced and
modern technologies, primarily due to the high cost of sourcing and updating these
technologies, restrictive patent rights acquisition, and limited knowledge on new
technologies (URT 2016, 17). 
Furthermore, patent data form a consistent basis for comparisons across time and
countries. Patent data can be used in the analysis of a wide array of topics related to
technical change and patenting activity including industry-science linkages, licensing
strategies by companies, internationalisation of research, and indicators on the value
of patents  (see Lee and Lee 2008). From  Table  6,    Tanzania has the lowest patent
application (2) compared to other countries in the region. South Africa is the highest
with 7,644 patent applications. 
03 Practical approaches to produce
and design programme and
platforms for teaching and
practice
Asian countries gained success in economic development by focussing on small-holder
agriculture through the Green Revolution. By concentrating on smallholder agriculture,
Asian countries demonstrated the contribution of smallholder-oriented policy in
economic growth, employment creation, and poverty reduction (Deininger and Byerlee
2012). It may be for this reason that GoT recognises through the Agricultural Sector
Development Strategy  (ASDS-II 2015), that the focus on macro-economic benefits
from large-scale commercial farmers has not contributed to the reduction of poverty in
Tanzania. 
 
However, the expansion on agriculture or the commercialisation of agriculture, if
adequately managed, designed and implemented, may have a significant positive
impact on employment and technology transfer in host countries like
Tanzania (Blomström, Kokko, and Mucchielli 2003, Msuya 2007). Yet, most countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, including Tanzania and comparator countries lack adequate
financial capital, technology, and know-how (Alamirew et al. 2015, 1124). Technology
transfer depends on the performance and learning ability of host country farms, which
rely on the stock of their technical knowledge. While active learners will get access to
modern technology, passive watchers will be left behind. Additionally, institutional
factors - such as corruption, also play a significant role in impeding technology transfer
in SSA (Deininger and Byerlee 2012).
The GoT recognises that there is a scarcity of local capacity in technology development
centres around the country  (URT 2016, 146).  There is a need to increase  support for
train-the-trainers programmes with the active involvement of the private sector,
vocational training institutions & civil society. Consultants, think-tanks and civil society
groups can be useful in building bridges for innovation in technology transfer by
supporting and contributing to public-private partnerships  (Bessant and Rush 1995).
Some interventions by the private sector have been successful in terms of knowledge
and technology transfer in Tanzania (see Lange and Kinyondo 2016). 
It is essential to understand that public-private partnerships need the practical and
strategic support of civil society organisations and developmental partners who can
provide strategic interventions and institutional support for technology transfer and
innovation.  
IMPORTANT POINT!
we are usually engaged by different ministries at the end of a
project or policy process. When we provide valuable advice,
we are often treated as anti-government or anti-progress - so
I will  say we have not really been engaged that much in the
development of new investment policies in Tanzania.
By representative, Tanzania Business and Human
Rights (TBHR), interviewed June 2018
Such strategic and collaborative partnerships may have been established in institutions
such’s as the (TNBC) Tanzania National Business Council (1998), which deals with
challenges facing the private sector in Tanzania and coordinated by the Tanzania Private
Sector Foundation (TPSF). Another example of institutional support mechanisms for PPPs
is the Business Environment Strengthen for Tanzania (BEST-Dialogue), an initiative
supported by the Danish government. However, several civil society organisations still
experience limited levels of engagement with public institutions in investment and local
content requirement reforms
04 Maintaining and facilitativeclimate
The GoT seeks to strengthen the country’s focus on investment as a vector for growth and
integration in the industrial sector. In doing so, they GoT expects to improve the capacity of
local firms to diversify their activities and increase competitiveness on an international
scale    (URT 2016). Maintaining a facilitative climate for innovation, dissemination and
adoption of technology, i.e., providing a supportive policy environment, political leadership,
environmental stability, and internal social structure and capacity encourages business
support for technology transfer. In other words, the business regulatory environment
assesses the extent to which the legal, regulatory, and policy environments help or hinder
private businesses to invest in job creation and the growth and integration of local
industries in global value chains. 
The indicators used for accessing the business regulatory environment in this survey include
government efficiency, the role of law, political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and
accountability. 
Political Stability
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism indicators measure perceptions of the
likelihood of political instability and politically motivated violence, including
terrorism.  Figure  14 shows that although the perception of political stability is on the
decline, the trend is beginning to move upwards. Compared to other countries in the
region like Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, Tanzania is perceived to be relatively
stable. South Africa and Rwanda are seen to be more politically stable than other
countries in the region. 
*Estimate of political stability ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)
governance performance
 
Figure 14 Estimate of Governance on Political Stability and Absence of Violence in Tanzania
and Comparator Countries
Regulatory quality
This indicator captures perceptions about the government ability to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development.  Figure  15  shows that there is a weak believe that the government of
Tanzania can formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development. There has also being a decline in the level of
governance performance in regulatory quality since 2010, as shown in  Figure  15. Only
Burundi and Ethiopia score lower than Tanzania among comparator countries.
*Estimate of regulatory quality ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance
performance
 
Figure 15 Estimate of Governance on Regulatory Quality in Tanzania and Comparator Countries
Voice and Accountability
Rule of law
This indicator reflects the extent to which agents/businesses have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society. It also measures perceptions about the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence. Since 2015, there has been a sharp decline in the extent to which agents
including private sector actors have confidence in rules such as the quality of contract
enforcement and property rights in Tanzania (see Figure 16). For example, this period has
witnessed the withdrawal of land title deeds from several investors and the enactment of
laws which cause uncertainty in the protection of the rights of investors in Tanzania. In
May 2016, in an effort by President Magufuli to improve statuary control over land, the
government revoked ownership of more than 1,800 hectares (4,400 acres) of land  in the
Morogoro region to resolve conflicts between farmers and herders. Tanzania, like many
African countries, is noted for weak property rights and land laws  (Alden-Wily 2012,
Alden-Wily 2011).
*Estimate of the rule of law ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)
governance performance
 
Figure 16 Estimate of Governance on the Rule of Law in Tanzania and Comparator
Countries
It is the hope that the GoT will continue to make efforts to ensure that there are systems
and structures of governance to uphold the rule of law, which are democratic, effective
and ensure accountability, predictability, transparent, inclusiveness and corruption-free
at all levels (URT 2016, 76). 
The voice and accountability indicator reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's
citizens participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and free media. From  Figure 17,  the belief that citizens place on having a voice,
including freedom of the media is on the decline in Tanzania. This has severe implications for the
role played by the civil society and in the role played by the media in ensuring that there are
checks and balances within policy circles and control over the excessive use of power by public
institutions and private enterprises. 
*Estimate of voice and accountability ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5
(strong) governance performance
 






It may be  interesting for development practitioners to understand why Ethiopia, although
not part of the inter-governmental organisations in Eastern and Southern Africa, and often
characterised as autocratic, continues to outperform its comparator countries in all
indicators within the business environment category such as the GDP growth rate or the
influx of FDI. Rather than relying on good governance, or new institutional economic and
rational choice assumptions, a political settlement analysis may provide more plausible
answers to such a critique of the political economy of Ethiopia. Indeed, the concentration of
power within the ruling coalition, and the absence of a viable challenge to authority within
lower ranks of the ruling coalition increases the capacity of the ruling coalition to implement
and enforce more  predictable macroeconomic policies. Rwanda seems to follow the same
trend  (see Behuria and Goodfellow 2016), while countries like Uganda, and Burundi, with a
constant threat to the ruling coalition, underperform in many of the business environment
indicators. 
In recent years, the political settlement approach has enjoyed an increasingly influential role
within scholarly and policy circles in evaluating the effectiveness of various institutional and
policy interventions in African countries  (Behuria, Buur, and Gray 2017, 508). Unlike the
mainly institutional economic frameworks – that rely on formal market dynamics and ideas
about ‘good governance’ such as the innovation systems or value chains, the interest of the
political settlement analysis in developing countries is a function of the prominence of
informal social transactions within policy circles (Khan 2017, 644). 
Changes in the distribution of power are not necessarily aligned to formal
arrangements. For example, the political stability in Tanzania after the introduction of
neoliberal policies is the ‘legacy of attempts to centralise political power – holding
power - within the [ruling political party] and restrict forms of political competition’-
mainly by ring-fencing investment incentives in favour of influential business actors at
the commanding heights of the Tanzanian economy  (Gray 2013, 194).    Political
settlements are studied with an assumption that power is rooted in history  (Behuria,
Buur, and Gray 2017, 512). To be able to understand the current state of public-private
partnerships in Tanzania is to understand how far the country has come. What has been
the mindset of political leadership? What is the nature of the governance system in
relation to the evolution of policies? How have social groups responded to these
changes or reforms over time? The only way to understand the distribution of
organisational power in Tanzania today is to look at its history and see how public and
private sector organisations have mobilised, won and lost in the past. 
This section illustrates using examples drawn from interviews, extensive documentary
analysis and literature review to explain how disruptive variables affect the evolution of
policies within the business environment in Tanzania (see Figure 18). The section does so
by understanding the history of public-private partnerships in Tanzania under five broad
history windows. These windows have been categorised based on ‘political ruptures’,
moments of profound change which structured new divisions of power, political and
economic changes within the business environment in Tanzania. It sheds more light on
leadership, ideology and the evolution of the developmental ambitions of the ruling
coalition over time. 
Figure 18 Timeline of the political settlement of public-private partnerships in Tanzania
1961-2018
The State Enterprise 
To Nyerere, the economy of the newly independent Tanzania was typically colonial and
depended on subsistence production and primary commodities for export. In the 1960s,
import-substituting industrialisation strategies provided a favourable environment for
industry to grow - mainly because of state subsidies and favourable tariffs on manufactured
imports (Gray 2013, 188). Economic progress and dissociation from the capitalist economic
structure left by the Europeans depended fundamentally on hard work, freedom and self-
reliance (kujitegemea) (Fatton 1985, Lal 2012). For example, in 1962, Nyerere experimented
with a ‘self-help scheme’, resulting in the haphazard expansion of infrastructure all over the
country (Bjerk 2015, 109). People began to build schools, dispensaries, roads, and other hard
infrastructure on their initiative. The ambition to mobilise all Tanzanians for development
was the quintessence of the independence rhetoric (Bryceson 1980).  
 
The goal was to create an industrial base upon which Tanzania could become a predominantly
self-sustaining economy  (Bryceson 1980, 547). This resulted in the emergence of the co-
operative movements in 1962 to take the place of Asian and Arabs who had acted as
middlemen under colonial rule  (Aminzade 2003). Hundreds of cooperatives and unions
joined to form the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika in 1962. According to Burke (1964, 209),
in 1963, there were more than 800 societies with membership exceeding 300,000.
Nevertheless, industrial policy was successful and colonial restrictions that had reserved
certain industrial activities for British firms were removed (Mbilinyi 1986). The cooperatives
moved into wholesale, retail and import businesses  (Nindi 1977).  The expansion of the co-
operative movement into trade pushed Tanzanian–Asians into the manufacturing sector
industry  (Coulson 1982). Hence, ownership in the industrial and manufacturing  sector
became predominantly Tanzanian-Asian (Gray 2013). Some examples of the firms established
under Asian ownership during this period include textile firms such as Sunguratex and Kilitex,
glass bottle manufacturing firms like Kioo Limited and ALAF (Aluminium Africa Ltd) for
aluminium products. 
IMPORTANT POINT!
During Mw Nyerere's era, Tanzania was industrialised. We had a textile
industry which grew so fast, we had a bicycle factory which was
thriving...you can see that was the first bicycle we produced (pointing to a
picture with Mw. Nyerere riding a bicycle),  and we had a paper mill.
Former director, Tanzania Breweries Ltd, interviewed
September 2018
Tariffs were often set based on discussions between investors and the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry rather than through a cohesive industrial strategy  (Rweyemamu
1966). The association of newly established private sector actors with state elites influenced
political and economic decisions in several public institutions like the Ministry of
Cooperatives and Community Development  (Burke 1964, 210). The likely outcome was a
tendency for increased bureaucracy and clientelism (Chazan et al. 1999). One consequence
of this association was the replacement of local organisations with the Tanzania
Development Corporation. The task of the corporation was to ensure the development of
industry adhered to national interests (Rweyemamu 1966, Mramba and Mwansasu 1972).
However, faced with challenges due to the absence of adequate supervision, lack of proper
planning and coordination within the industrial and manufacturing sectors (Saul 1975),
corrupt elites began exploiting small-scale producers, and local monopolies started to
emerge. 
The Tanzanian Development Corporation was dissolved in 1964 to form the National
Development Corporation (NDC). The newly formed NDC had a more socialist defined
objective to build up public enterprises. The NDC was also involved in establishing public
partnerships with private businesses to ensure that investments provided through public
support were properly utilised. The newly formed corporation was the instrument of public
ownership in manufacturing, industries and mining  (Nyerere 1972). By bringing in needed
finance into targeted private businesses, the government directly  intervened in supporting
struggling businesses and also became minority partners for several firms and corporations.
However, the private sector continued to exist despite the implementation of the
nationalisation policies, and regulatory reforms against ‘possessive individualism’ through
the 1967 Arusha Declaration (Jackson 1979, 219).  Additionally, Previous managers, mainly
Tanzanian-Asians, remained as managers of the newly nationalised industries (Gray 2013).
The increasing dominance of Tanzanian-Asians in policy and business circles and their strong
influence on the ruling political party created animosity within parliament. Several Tanzania
elites began advocating for the ‘indigenisation of the economy’ (Aminzade 2000, 2003). The
horizontally excluded faction of the ruling coalition – who advocated for the Africanisation of
the economy, relied on indigenisation debates as a critique of the industrial policies
implemented by the ruling coalition – which largely favoured Tanzanian-Asians. This meant
that political relations between the state and Tanzania-Asian investors became difficult (Gray
2013). Following the 1967 Arusha Declaration, the government adopted an interventionist
approach through stringent price controls with the objective to create a  public  sector-led
development  (Muganda 2004). The need to obtain state permits for price-controlled
items  pushed  market  goods  into an economy created by linkages along political party
line  (Waters 1992). By the end of 1968, the government had taken over control of over
thirteen firms. The first Five-year Development Plan, drafted under the guidance of the new
Ministry of Development Planning, specified the scope of planned public investment (Morse
1964). However, because of the lack of an indigenously owned industrial sector, almost all the
industrial firms that were nationalised were owned by Tanzanian – Asians  (Gray 2013). In
such social and economic contexts, the span of social networks  can be  stronger than the
reach of formal institutions (Chazan et al. 1999, 101). 
Additionally, lower factions of the economy, labour unions, increasingly demanded better
working condition  (Coulson 1982, Coulson 1979). There was an increase in the number of
strikes till Trade unionism was reorganised in 1964 to form the National Union of Tanganyika
Workers. The National Union of Tanganyika Workers  played an essential
role  in  disciplining  the  workforce, especially in restraining demands for higher wages and
promoting positive attitudes towards work (Morse 1964). 
Nyerere also  introduced legislation to prevent, regulate and settle labour disputes.  (1) The
Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Act, No. 51 of 1962; (2) the Civil Service (Negotiating
Machinery) Act, No. 52 of 1962; and (3) the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act, No. 43 of
1962.  Together, these regulatory instruments considerably  kerbed  the power of the trade
unions  (Jackson 1979, 226).   The focus on industrial policy, the discipline of labour under
socialism and rapid capital investments by the state contributed  to the growth in labour
productivity until 1973 (Gray 2013).
The top-left quadrant of the political settlement framework in Figure 18 represents a scenario,
which is representative of the period under socialist rule in Tanzania. Business environment
policies were weak and discouraged private property and business through the 1967 Arusha
declaration. However, the ability of the ruling coalition to co-opt powerful groups of the
private sector, Tanzanian-Asians, allowed the ruling coalition to sustain its developmental
ambitions in the short term. Additionally, the disciplining of lower factions of the ruling
coalition through new labour union reforms and regulation contributed to an increase in
labour productivity. In 1974, the private sector still accounted for 30 per cent of salaried
employment.
 
While the extractive industry was negatively impacted by Nyerere’s position to ‘leave the
resources under the ground till Tanzanians are competent enough to manage them’ (Lange and
Kinyondo 2016), industrial progress was predominantly based on consumer
goods (Rweyemamu 1966, Mramba and Mwansasu 1972) and assembly-type activities   - like
the bicycle factory which imported parts from India (Coulson 1982, Mwapachu 2005). On the
other hand, the agriculture sector saw the creation of production units under the  ujamaa
vijijini scheme, which introduced a major legitimacy crisis for the ruling coalition. The top-
down approach used in the implementation of the developmental ambitions under the
Nyerere regime such as the  Ujamaa vijijini  scheme contributed to the failure of the
programme  (Bryceson 1982).  While the extension of state control was meant to transfer
power to workers and to peasants, in reality, economic control was increasingly vested in an
expanding group of party, bureaucratic and management officials (Shivji 1976).
Parastatals had access to state subsidies, finance from state-owned commercial banks, and
foreign concessional financing.      Parastatals also benefited from rents related to import
substitution, such as those created by tariffs and exchange rate policy (Bigsten and Danielsson
1999). However, by 1974, the industrial sector began to show signs of poor economic
performance, mainly due to falling productivity and chronic underutilisation capacities. For
example, textile mills recorded less than 10% capacity utilisation by mid-1980s (Gray 2013).
The government struggled to compete with the cost of subsidies and funding for public
enterprises and local industries. Additionally,  External factors such as the 1979 war with
Uganda  (Acheson-Brown 2001)  and pressures from proponents of the neoliberal
orthodoxy  (Gibbon 1995, Hewitt 1999)  began pushing for economic and political reforms
which resulted in a change of the political settlement within the business environment and the
inability of the ruling coalition to enforce its policy and ideological ambition of socialism. 
Introduction of Neoliberalism and multi-party
politics 
IMPORTANT POINT!
Mwinyi undertook to open up investments not only
nationally, but of a regional character and it did inculcate
some understanding by big business people in the region
because Tanzania was thought of as a socialist country and
now they realised; Oh wait a minute! We now have a
country with a president who is opening up space to private
investments.
By former sectary general of Tanzania Chambers of
Commerce Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA),
Interviewed, September 2018
After the resignation of Nyerere in 1985, Tanzania witnessed a shift towards a more
neoliberal economic structure. Following the failures of the socialist regime, President
Ali Hassan Mwinyi adjusted his developmental desires to the conditionalities of foreign
financiers, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In all,
the economic and political reforms  in the 1980s brought  around three fundamental
changes in Tanzania (1) The devaluation of the shilling (Loxley 1989). (2) Changes in the
political structure, - introduced by the 1991 Zanzibar Declaration and
multipartism  (Cameron 2019).    (3)  Changes in the  regulatory  framework, including
investment and private property laws in the introduction of the 1990 Investment
Act.  However,  the IMF and the World Bank subjected economic reforms to close
supervision and led to the constriction of domestic space for exercising policy
sovereignty  (Mwapachu 2005, 135, Therkildsen 2000, 64). This also meant that the
ruling coalition was weak and vulnerable to a growing and stronger private-sector
faction. It was in the interest in the ruling coalition to secure its short-term survival by
co-opting the influence of powerful actors within the private sector. 
 
Nonetheless,  many of the political elites, especially those who advocated for the
indigenisation of the economy, viewed the political and financial influence of these
multilateral institutions as intrusive  (Picard and Garrity 1994). The ruling coalition
continued to maintain its  relationship with the industrial ownership structure that had
been created under the socialist period (Gray 2013). The GoT was now ready to welcome
private investors, evident in the National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act,
1990, and the 1991 Zanzibar declaration, which overhauled the restrictions to own
business and private property in the 1961 Arusha declaration. The 1990 investment act
was a product of proponents of indigenisation debates and the Africanisation of the
economy, which saw some areas of the economy protected for exclusive investment by
local investors – these included areas like including retail  shops, exchange bureaux,
travel agencies, restaurants, petrol stations, the media, mining, security companies, and
building contracting (Biermann and Wagao 1986).
The change from a socialist economy to a liberal economy spurred the need for changes
in legislation, and the task to prepare new legislation for investments was entrusted to
three institutions  (Peter and Mwakaje 2004, 11). These were the Ministry of Finance,
Economic Affairs and Planning; Tanzania Industrial Studies and Consulting Organisation
(TISCO); and Technical Assistance Group of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical
Cooperation, London. The production of a full-fledged investment law was dependent
on a discussion report titled ‘The promotion of Private Investment in Tanzania’ prepared by
the Technical Assistance Group of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation
(CFTC) in 1987. The GoT was now ready to welcome private investors, evident in the
enactment of the National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act, 1990, and the
1991 Zanzibar declaration, which also overhauled the restrictions to own business and
private property in the 1961 Arusha declaration.
The new 1990 Investment Act further introduced the Investment Promotion Centre
(IPC) together with provisions prescribing application procedures, investment
incentives, dispute settlements and transfer of foreign currency  (Peter and Mwakaje
2004). In 1991, subsidies provided to farmers were suspended. The removal of
government subsidies in 1991 badly affected local food production and rural
development as farmers depended heavily on these inputs  (Mbonile 1995). These
developmental programmes led to unfair competition for small-scale farmers and infant
industries in Tanzania  (Meertens 2000, 337). Increasing levels of inequality within the
private sector and public service began to emerge (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996, 303).
On a political front, mounting pressures from horizontally excluded factions of the ruling
coalition who advocated for economic reforms on racial grounds were prohibited from
mobilising supporters based on race (or ethnicity or religion). However, indigenisation
debates remained a dominant issue within the newly established multiparty electoral
system  (Aminzade 2003, Nagar 1996).  For example, Rev. Christopher Mtikila of the
Democratic Party denounced Indians and Arabs as thieves and looters of the country’s
wealth (gabacholis), and  claimed that the economy was run by 161 Tanzanian- Asians at
the expense of indigenous Africans or the downtrodden people (mkombozi wa walahoi)
as he called them (Aminzade 2003, 52). In a seemly strategic move, ruling political party
elites like Idi Simba began substituting the indigenisation rhetoric as a struggle against
foreign interference. 
 
In other words, to excluded factions of the ruling coalition like Mwakitwangwe and
Mtikila,  indigenisation  was defined in terms of race and advocated for an economy
designed for indigenous black Africans (wazawa), excluding Tanzanian-Asians as disloyal
outsiders who are exploiting the nation for their benefit  (Aminzade 2000, 44). On the
other hand, ruling political party elites like Idi Simba, leader of the Confederation of
Tanzania Industries (CTI), transformed the debates to a struggle based on territory.
Here,  indigenisation  draws a different boundary, between citizens (wananchi) and
foreigners, and seeks to protect the nation’s economy and culture from the threat of
foreign domination (Aminzade 2000, 44).
 
The political elites, especially those who advocated for indigenisation against foreign
interference, viewed the political and financial influence of the IMF and the World Bank
as intrusive  (Picard and Garrity 1994). However, the ruling coalition continued to
maintain its relationship with the industrial ownership structure that had been created
under the socialist period  (Gray 2013). In fact, the meaning of the
term  indigenous  (uzawa) shifted from a racially charged designator of the boundary
between Tanzanian-Asians and African Tanzanians to a term used to designate the
boundary between foreigners and citizens  (Aminzade 2000, 46). It marked
what  Zoomers (2010)  describes as the ‘foreignisation of space’ within the investment
environment in Tanzania. 
 
Nonetheless, the IMF and the World Bank continued to subject economic reforms to
close supervision and led to the constriction of domestic space for exercising policy
sovereignty  (Mwapachu 2005, 135, Therkildsen 2000, 64).  Loxley (1989)  provides a
detailed account of the ‘dispute’ between the IMF and ‘powerful groups’ of the
Tanzanian economy in the 1980s. The private sector was marred by conflicts
within    political elites, leading to lack of coalition in the voice of local private sector
actors and increase in levels of clientelism and corruption within political and business
circles  (Mwapachu 2005). Several authors have highlighted the lack of convergence
around the implementation of the economic and political reforms introduced by the IMF
and the World Bank (Shivji 1991, Doriye 1992, Hewitt 1999). This also meant that the
ruling coalition was weak and vulnerable to a growing and stronger private-sector
faction. It was in the interest in the ruling coalition to secure its short-term survival by
co-opting the influence of powerful actors within the private sector
Implementation of the neoliberal
orthodoxy 
The transition to multi-party politics in 1995, was dominated by advocates for broader
investment policies, specifically to encourage foreign investments. The new market-led
approach to industrial development was set out in the Sustainable Industries
Development Policy 1996 to 2020  (Gray 2013, 191). There was a corresponding
increase in coalitions between elites in the private sector and the ruling party.
According to  Andreoni (2017), during this period, corruption became a significant
driver of change within the ruling coalition. The ruling elite failed to build effective
state institutions to oversee the realisation of its broad-based developmental
objectives. President Mkapa was nominated with approval from a still influential
Nyerere, to take over the leadership of the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and oversee
the transition of the country into a multiparty democratic state. New investment laws
were introduced through the 1997 Tanzania Investment Act, which opened up
investments in any sectors as long as the requisite capital of 100,000USD for local
investors and 300,000 USD for foreign investors was/is met. The new 1997 Investment
Act abolished the protection of domestic industries or the ring-fencing of investment
sectors for local investors. In the mining sector, institutional requirements for local
content became weaker through the 1998 Mining Act - as elaborately described
by Lange and Kinyondo (2016, 1097).
IMPORTANT POINT!
The World Bank’s Strategy for African Mining technical
paper, 1992 “criticised the previous local content, local
employment and local ownership requirements and
specifically recommended the state not to distinguish
domestic from foreign investors and not to use mining as an
engine of employment generation” (Hansen, 2013:20). The
World Bank’s five-year Mineral Sector Technical Assistance
Project culminated in the drafting and implementation of
the 1998 Mining Act (Butler, 2004:68) which makes no
mention of local content.
by Lange and Kinyondo (2016, 1097).
Public sector banking continued until their privatisation in 1999/2000, a significant
decision of President Mkapa. Nyerere's resistance to privatising the banking sector was
defeated after his demise in 1999. To Nyerere, banks such as the National Bank of
Commerce (NBC), were ‘the people's bank’. It was the perception, among a majority of
Tanzanians that State-owned enterprises were ‘the people’s assets (Mali ya
Umma)’  (Mwapachu 2005, 396). Those associated with owning state enterprises were
derogatorily referred to as ‘bloodsuckers'- deemed capitalist exploiters  (Brennan 2012).
In fact, the government privatised publicly owned institutions, which were bought
mainly by Tanzanian-Asians who had strong links with the global market  (Aminzade
2013), which also gave rise to an unprecedented period of large-scale land investments
by private investors in Tanzania (Ngoitiko et al. 2010, 273). 
 
For example, while indigenous manufacturing increased after the liberalisation of the
economy in mainly petit manufacturing activities, around 26% of all manufacturing
firms was owned by Asian capital by 2002  (Gray 2013). A larger part was owned by
foreign companies, with 1% of manufacturing remaining under public control  (Kinabo
2004). There was a surge in the number of public policies and strategies to attract
foreign investments.  Therkildsen (2000, 62)  satirically referred to this surge as
‘projectitis’, with over 2,000 development projects listed by the  World Bank (1994,
194). 
IMPORTANT POINT!
There was no policy or system in place to prepare
[ordinary] Tanzanians and allow them to participate in
the privatisation process. The entire privatisation was
carried out so that people would come from outside
and bythe public enterprises. That was the concept. It
was not a concept of supporting Tanzanians to
participate in the privatisation and own these
businesses. 
By board member of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation,
interviewed September 2018
Additionally, the lack of an effective institutional and regulatory framework in the wake
of market-led investments affected the functioning of  state institutions such as the
Tanzania Revenue Authority which became plagued by high-level of
corruption (Fjeldstad 2003). For example, the falsification of VAT receipts to the tune of
shillings 34 billion per annum by 2003, and increasing cases of tax exemption of
approximately 414 billion in 2001 contributed to losses in Tax revenue by the
government  (Osoro 1995, Mwapachu 2005). The absence of robust regulatory and
oversight institutions in Tanzania allowed corrupt politicians and institutions to engage
in rent-seeking with devastating consequences on the economy (Cooksey 2017, 4).
 
The political settlement during this period was characterised by weak local content
requirements, exemplified in the 1998 mining and 1997 investment act, the incentive to
attract foreign investment was strong. However, the business environment was plagued
with high levels of corruption and weak institutional mechanisms to boast revenue
buoyancy. There were high incidences of capital flight through tax evasion/avoidance,
corruption and clientelism. 
Legitimacy Crisis of the
neoliberal Orthodoxy 
A review of the Tanzanian Development  Vision (TDV) 2025 in 2010 resulted in a
recommendation for the government to allocate appropriate resources, for accelerated
sustainable and inclusive  economic growth (Mashindano and Maro 2011). The review
showed that the rate of economic growth did not correlate with poverty reduction,
gender equality and improved livelihood levels. Many development objectives of the
ruling coalition became populist vehicles for promises during election
campaigns (Kelsall 2018).
In the recent report of the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy  (ASDS-II 2015),
the GoT acknowledges that the focus on large commercial farms has made little
contribution to the reduction of poverty in Tanzania. Authors of the TDV review report
attributed this mismatch in economic growth and poverty to high levels of dependency
with over 70% of the population below the ages of 30, unemployment and the lack of
technical and scientific capacity needed by industry. As an outcome of the
recommendations made in the review, the government introduced the Big Results Now
(BRN) programme, launched in 2013 and aimed at improving the provision of public
services  (Janus and Keijzer 2015). 
According to    Janus and Keijzer (2015),    the Big Results  Now (BRN) programme
prioritised short-term gains over longer-term sustainability. Results based cooperation
models were ‘over-simplistic incentive models’ and did not take into account the past
and present cultural, and social realities of Tanzania  (Pearson, Johnson, and Ellison
2010, 320). By the end of the Kikwete administration in 2015, the contradictions
between the ideas of the ruling class and the lived experiences of common Tanzanians
had become palpable. Increasing corruption scandals and the imminent disintegration
of the ruling political party  (Fouéré 2008, Cooksey 2017),  paved the way for a leader
who would advocate for change, and disrupt the business as usual approach in
Tanzania(Pelizzo and Bekenova 2016). It was also compounded by inhouse fighting
within the ranks of the ruling coalition. It has been argued that the pragmatism of
President Magufuli, his anti-establishment agenda and fight against corruption
propelled him to the head of a nation, and a ruling political party which needed
fundamental changes in structure - principles, values and institutions.  An image
undoubtedly different from the neoliberal reforms introduced in the late 1980s (Pelizzo
and Bekenova 2016).
 
The bottom - right of the political settlement framework represents a scenario where
the local content requirement was weak, yet the ambition of the ruling coalition to
attract FDI was strong as demonstrated in Figure 5 and the plethora of developmental
projects in the agricultural sector. In this scenario, private sector investors did not
adhere to local content requirements but continued to provide capital which was co-
opted by government elites in rent-seeking and clientelism. Capital needed for the
protection and support of local industries was misused. The ruling coalition saw a
decrease in political support, and also struggle to compete with the cost of subsidies for
infant industries.  
The Rise of New
Nationalism
Indeed, the increasing and multifarious impacts of direct investment and land
acquisition by foreign investors continue to stimulate debates about excessive foreign
involvement in investment policy and design in Tanzania (Zoomers 2010, 86, Schlimmer
2018).    The emergence of what  Shivji (2019)  has described as ‘new nationalism' in
Tanzania is in part linked to (1) the increasing levels of distrust in the political class due
to perceived high levels of corruption  (Pelizzo and Bekenova 2016). (2) the perceived
‘foreignisation of spaces’ due to the increasing impact of foreign involvement on
investment deals and investment policy  (Schlimmer 2018)  and (3) the
disenfranchisement of an agrarian workforce within a capitalist-oriented, industrial
skills-starved economy  (Amin 2017, Ngoitiko et al. 2010). Political actors in Tanzania
and in other Eastern African countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya as argued
by Boone (2014) have transformed the debate around large-scale land investments into
political capital and rallying calls to attract voters (Schlimmer 2018, 88). 
The new regime brings us back to the top-left of the political settlement framework
where the business environment incentive is weak but hoping to move towards the top-
right of the political settlement represented by strong local content requirements and
good business environment incentives -  BWi  = LCRi.  President J. P. Magufuli became
president of Tanzania in November 2015. During his first days in office, Magufuli sought
to regain the trust and political support of Tanzanians and has borrowed some of
Nyerere’s rhetoric, with a focus on work ethics (hapa kazi tu), public morality and the re-
introduction of ‘big-government’ economics  (URT 2016). It may be for this reasons
that  Cheeseman (2018)  argues that  Magufuli’s leadership does not represent a real
break with the past, but instead needs to be understood in the context of the country’s
return to a more statist economic approach under Nyerere. This political settlement
places the current ruling coalition back to the in the top-left quadrant as shown
in Figure 18.
 
His focus on social policies and anti-establishment campaigns came through when he
introduced free education for the ages of 8-12 in 2015  (Asim, Chugunov, and Gera
2019). Magufuli publicly cancelled Independence Day celebrations in 2016 and asked
that the cost of celebration be deviated to the improvement of health service in the
country. Magufuli has presented himself as ‘the president for the poor’ and relies on this
popular support as political leverage, against his opponents and political enemies. ‘His
taste for the dramatic has caught public attention and his willingness to disturb the
status quo has convinced many that his intentions are more sincere than those of his
predecessors’ (Paget 2017, 2019).  
IMPORTANT POINT!
When a leader [Magufuli] comes as a sovereign state and
rejects things which are not consonant with the
sovereignty of the state, he must correct them. It’s not
an abuse of office. Correct those things so that Tanzania
natural resources are exploited for the purpose of
helping Tanzanians [not foreigners]. 
Interviewed, September 2018
In 2017, Magufuli ordered the arrest of several public and business figures involved in
the Escrow scandal. According to  Cooksey (2017), those arrested had privileged
relationships with powerful and influential government officials. In doing so, Magufuli
has distanced himself from the political and business elite and consolidated power
around his ruling coalition. The GoT has been slow to associate itself with large
developmental projects like the SAGCOT and according to experts ‘the relationship
seems to be cold nobody really understands’.  
It is common to see or hear Magufuli reprimanding government and business official in
public for failing to fulfil their duties. In his first years in office, ‘Magufuli seized idle land
from investors to return to poor farmers’ as headlined in a Reuters article on the 1st June
2016 (Makoye 2016). During the launch of the second phase of the Agricultural Sector
Development Plan (ASDP) in 2018, president Magufuli publicly questioned why the
president of the Tanzania Agriculture Development Bank (TADB) was still in service,
when money intended for small-scale farmers (Shs 186.5 billion), was loaned to
borrowers such as investment banks, and other financial institutions who were not
involved in any agriculture-related activity. 
 
The current political regime presents itself through political rhetoric and actions by
making social claims, used by governments to reshape the business environment. For
example, Magufuli has transferred the ‘investment docket’ from the Tanzania
Investment Centre (TIC) to the Prime Minister’s Offices, placed under a Minister of
State Hon. Angela Kairuki. Additionally, Magufuli cancelled  the appointment of the
TIC’s executive director who had been appointed by Kikwete in 2013 and created a new
Land Investment Unit (LIU) under the purview of the Ministry of Land. A decision
motivated by the president’s efforts to remediate the TIC’s lack of efficiency  (Bélair
2018, 379).
 
Magufuli’s election in November 2015 was built on the mantra of anti-corruption and a
drive for greater industrialisation (URT 2016). Cheeseman (2018), adds that by focusing
on making the government ‘perform’ for the people, Magufuli has raised public
expectations of a ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) that has stagnated over the
last 20 years. His industrialisation campaign has also been demonstrated through
imposed caps on interest rates at seven per cent (7%). It is expected that this will boost
private sector borrowing for investment and economic growth  (BoT 2019,
TanzaniaInvest 2018b). However, excessive taxes may continue to increase the burden
of loan repayment by domestic private sector actors, SMEs, and banks may be less
viable due to increases in non-performing loans and low-interest rates. For example, in
January 2018, five banks were closed by the BoT due to the detrimental capital position
of the said banks (TanzaniaInvest 2018a).
New reforms within foreign private investments, exemplified in the passing of laws such
as the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act (PSA) of July 2017,
may see the withdrawal of many investors from Tanzania (Scurfield and Mihalyi 2017).
The BoT (BoT 2018, 4) reports that there has been a decline of FDI from an average of
2.1 billion USD in 2013 to 1.2 Billion in 2017. In October 2018, the government of
Tanzania gave the Dutch government a notice of intent to terminate its Bilateral
Investment Treaty with the Netherlands. 
CONCLUSIONS
This report has provided an overview of private-public partnerships by looking at the
business environment and local content requirements in Tanzania as the starting point.
Although the report uses data from the World Bank and the Global Innovation Index
Indicators to provide a macro-level representation of the business environment in
Tanzania,    it, however, deviates from the institutional economic analysis and relies on a
political settlement approach. The report describes the business environment (BE) as a
combination of internal and external factors that influence the operating capacity of
private sector actors in a given country or socio-political and economic context. These
factors include the availability of a reliable ecosystem for businesses such as consumer
capacity - clients and suppliers, improvements in science, technology and incentives for
innovation, the rule of law, government policy and politics, and market, social and economic
trends. 
 
While constant efforts have been made by the GoT to improve the business environment
and encourage technology transfer through local content reforms and regulations, social
interactions between the ruling coalition and private sector actors have undermined the
implementation of these reforms in the past. The report defines technology transfer as  a
process that facilitates the diffusion of technological knowledge among users in Tanzania,
with attention given to general issues related to the development of technological
capabilities. Comprehensively, there is no clear-cut definition for technology transfer, and
it often relates to the theoretical and practical knowledge, skills, and artefacts that can be
used to develop products and services as well as used for their production and delivery. 
 
From a political settlement analysis, little effort has been made to marry government
developmental ambitions and the expectations of the private sector. It ultimately
culminated in a legitimacy crisis of the neoliberal orthodoxy and the ruling coalition which
was plagued with high levels of corruption and tax evasion by 2015. The political
settlement was disrupted by the election of a president whose ambition is to discipline rent
and take active rule in deals making. The current GoT is seeking ways to rebalance its
relationship with the private sector, why ensuring that local content requirements are met.
However, as acknowledged in the FYDPII, such a business unusual approach is likely to
trigger trade-offs.  This also presents an opportunity for developmental organisations to
develop new strategies and dialogue mechanisms which are non-confrontational and
propose solutions that can marry public policy and private sector ambitions. It will be
beneficial for the GoT and associated public institutions to engage in a rigorous
deliberative process to improve public buy-in into the developmental ambitions of
Tanzania.
In the past, expert opinion has failed to reflect socio-political realities on the ground, and
feedback mechanisms for complaints and improvement have been neglected at the expense
of macro-economic benefits which have not added to revenue buoyancy. For an
improvement in technology transfer, local content requirements must be balanced with the
attractiveness of the business environment in Tanzania. 
Possible Steps
Tax administration: The introduction of Electronic Fiscal Device (EFD) and online Tax
Identification Numbers (TIN) by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) can help
improve Tax administration in the country. If implemented properly, these measures can
increase the amount of tax revenue and transparency. Rather than focus on increasing
the number of taxes, governments should focus on effective and efficient tax
administration. Increasing taxes may be a deterrent to business and may continue to
negatively affect technology transfer.
 
Access to finance: Public and private institutions should increase incentives for equity
services and make efforts to reduce load repayment burden for  local and infant
industries. The aim is to ensure that risk on investments  is mitigated by addressing a
broader set of factors that can  influence innovation adoption, including education
levels, patents, knowledge sharing, political stability and infrastructure (soft and hard).
Thus, policies need to be flexible enough to raise awareness and to permit potential
beneficiaries and innovators to explore and evaluate technologies against context-
specific criteria prior to adoption.
 
Sharing of information about technology: Information about innovation is not usually
free and widely available. Policies and efforts towards technology transfer and
innovation need to make use of extensive use of a wide range of communication
channels to ensure that information promotion and diffusion component are easily
accessible to a wider audience.  Transactions in technology transfer  are progressive,
intersectoral, multidisciplinary and  not always on the basis of one-to-one.    Therefore,
rather than rely exclusively on donor led recommendations, African governments and
the Tanzanian government, in particular, must involve local institutions, activist, and
consultants who can play a critical role of bridging the managerial capacities needed to
identify, absorb, disseminate and assimilate context-specific input of knowledge  and
technology required for a successful transfer. 
Several technologies and knowledge requirements in the Tanzanian economy such as
agricultural tools, machinery, improved seed varieties, policy formulation, mining and
engineering equipment etc. might need to be sourced from a combination of suppliers,
actors and institutions. Governments must be able to identify competently trained
intermediate organisations e.g. research institutions, mining consultants, vocational
training centres – who are able to understand local knowledge gaps. The intermediate
organisation can act as a managing agent, who is charged with the monitoring and
evaluation of capacity gaps and progress,  sourcing of competent agents base on private
sector demands, and help to enable and assure effective technology transfer. 
Valorisation of local actors: Public-private partnership ventures or initiatives need to
identify role models and opinion leaders at community and sector level. If correctly
identified, there is a greater likelihood for  other local industries to adopt new
technologies by following or copying these role models. Public-private partnerships and
related policies should be designed to include facilities which encourage continuous
interaction and exchange between a wide range of local stakeholders such as
researchers, entrepreneurs, policymakers and financial institutions. This can be done
through symposia, trade fairs, conferences and other networking events. 
 
Skills training:  There is often a strong cultural dimension embedded within a particular
technology. The transfer of technology through public-private partnerships may fail
because there is a lack of appreciation of the cultural, historical and socio-political
difference between countries, sectors or even local contexts.  Public and private sector
actors must take into account the importance of the cultural determinants underlying
the success or failure of technology transfer.  There is a need to increase spending in
professional and technical training programmes which builds technological capacity and
learning processes to absorb and optimise the technology. Resources should also be
channelled towards the post-adoption period as well as promote or facilitate
the adoption of technology.
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